A Response by Faraday, Fay & Tucker, Eric
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University
Osgoode Digital Commons





Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, etucker@yorku.ca
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the
Litigation Commons
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works
4.0 License.
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles & Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Recommended Citation
Faraday, Fay, and Eric Tucker. "A Response." Relations Industrielles/Industrial Relations 69.2 (2014): 459-463.




Visiting Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University
Innovation Fellow, Metcalf Foundation
Eric Tucker
Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University
We want to thank the editors for choosing our book for a review forum and 
for their recognition that it raises important issues regarding farm workers’ strug-
gles for labour rights, and the institutional and jurisprudential debates over the 
meaning of freedom of association. We also appreciate the difficulties that re-
viewers face when writing about edited collections rather than authored books, 
since by their very nature they bring together different ways of approaching com-
mon themes and concerns rather than presenting a single, unified argument.
So it will be useful to begin our response by reiterating the common commit-
ments that brought together the book’s editors and contributors: we all shared a 
commitment to the goal of promoting labour rights for agricultural workers and 
a belief that constitutional litigation could be a tool through which that objective 
was advanced. We want the implication of this formulation to be clear: we do 
not believe that constitutional rights and constitutional litigation were ever or are 
now the only or even the best means for advancing the struggle for labour rights 
for farm workers. That is not a position that is advocated in the volume. 
However, the reality is that laws actively prescribe and sustain a particular 
balance of power. Laws actively construct relationships of domination/subordination 
and constrain the space for particular kinds of collective workplace action. In 
this context, Charter litigation is one tool that is available to hold governments 
accountable, to require governments to give real meaning to the most fundamental 
rights and freedoms, and to thereby open space for different forms of collective 
engagement and interaction. With respect to farm workers, Charter litigation is 
a tool that, for a while at least, held some promise of forcing governments to 
extend to farmworkers labour rights enjoyed by most other workers in Canada in 
an environment in which grassroots organizing and political lobbying had limited 
success in achieving even this modest goal.1 
The book was structured around these commitments. Some of the chapters 
(Tucker; Preisbisch; Pietropaolo’s photo essay) focused on mapping the historical 
and social context of the exclusion of farm workers from labour rights, including 
the enormous increase in the use of temporary migrants in recent decades. But 
rather than portraying farmworkers as victims, we wanted to document their 
struggles. Wayne Hanley, the president of the UFCW, the union that has principally 
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been in engaged in farm worker organizing, addresses these efforts in his chapter. 
It is important to emphasize that these efforts were not and are not limited to 
organizing bargaining units that could be certified under Wagner Act Model 
Collective Bargaining Statutes or challenging the constitutionality of farm worker 
exceptionalism. Rather, as Hanley emphasizes, the UFCW has been involved in 
“community building with workers and social justice allies; worker education and 
political lobbying (here and abroad); and legal challenges” (p. 66). We think that 
Donald Swartz unfairly characterizes Hanley’s account as “surprisingly satisfied,” 
without acknowledging the significant efforts that the UFCW has made for 
decades, working with a range of progressive groups to create and support 
the Agricultural Worker Alliance and the 10 community centres that have been 
established in rural communities across the country to provide legal support 
services and training in human rights, labour rights, housing and health and 
safety for migrant farm workers while in Canada, as well as organizing language 
training and social events for migrant workers. Swartz also fails to acknowledge 
the innovative transnational organizing and cooperation agreements that UFCW 
has undertaken. All of this deep community organizing and community building 
happen well outside any Wagner Act Model bargaining units or even bargaining 
legislation. To write the union off as Swartz does, based on its position regarding 
the NDP’s 1993 legislation, is not a very productive way to engage with a union, 
indeed the only union, that is active in the field, and is not a very productive way 
to engage with the question of alternative forms of organizing.
While we tried to be clear about our understanding that Charter litigation was 
just one tool for challenging farm worker exceptionalism, the focus of the book 
was on this experience. It is important to understand how the law operates and 
how courts operate to have a clear eyed view on the potential impact of different 
strategies for change. A different edited book could have been assembled about 
other facets of farm worker struggles and set as its agenda the important task of 
trying to devise new strategies to gain and benefit from labour rights, but that 
was not the goal of this book, as it was made clear from its title, Constitutional 
Labour Rights in Canada. Swartz does not seem to think that this is a worthy 
subject, but we do not feel defensive about our choice. 
There are obviously differences among the contributors in how they view 
Charter litigation. Some have written more critically about Charter litigation else-
where. Others have been actively engaged in Charter litigation for decades and 
so have a unique insight into where it can have leverage and also what its limita-
tions are. Regardless of these different starting points, Charter litigation has been 
a significant feature of the struggle to obtain labour rights—and other rights for 
marginalized groups—and so we think a critical examination of that experience 
is timely if we are to better understand both its possibilities and limits. This is not 
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the place to engage in a lengthy discussion of the articulation of law and political 
economy, but we believe it is important to make clear that we do not think the 
outcomes of particular cases can be read off social structures of accumulation. 
This is not to say that the law, and especially Charter litigation, are autonomous 
practices performed outside of relations of domination and subordination; but 
rather we also think it is important to recognize there are complex mediations 
that sometimes create spaces for progressive legal challenges that can be pried 
open and exploited when possible. 
The experience of the farm workers with the Charter is a good illustration of 
this. We would disagree with Travis Fast that 1982 and the adoption of the Charter 
was “the high water mark of social democratic instincts in the Canada body 
politic” and there is, certainly, no straight line trajectory in the court’s freedom 
of association jurisprudence that follows the rightward shift in Canadian politics. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court of Canada began its engagement with freedom 
of association by adopting a very thin view of its scope in the first trilogy of 
labour rights cases decided in 1987. It was the decision of the court in Dunmore, 
decided in 2001, at a time when neo-liberalism was more ascendant than it had 
been 14 years earlier, that opened the door to holding governments accountable 
to ensure labour laws complied with the Charter by requiring the State to 
protect the freedom of vulnerable workers to engage in associational activity. 
Six years later, in 2007, the court went one step further in Health Services and 
held that freedom of association protects the right to bargain collectively in the 
face of government assaults on public sector collective bargaining. Simply put, 
the original labour trilogy did not establish the limits of what is constitutionally 
possible in an increasingly hostile, neo-liberal environment.
Since the outcomes of constitutional litigation are not directly determined by 
broader political and economic forces, it is worthwhile considering the internal 
dynamics of law and the possibilities for making legal arguments that might 
persuade courts to rein in neo-liberal State practices. Many of the chapters in 
this book, written by academics and practicing lawyers, engage in this project 
(Fudge; Faraday; Cavalluzzo; Barrett and Poskanzer; Macklem; and Ewing and 
Hendy). They saw an opportunity in Fraser to build on the precedents established 
in Dunmore and Health Services, to force the Ontario government to provide 
agricultural workers with a statutory regime that would give them a meaningful 
and effective opportunity to engage in collective bargaining. 
We want to emphasize here the point made by Judy Fudge and Paul Cavalluzzo 
in their chapters. This was not a case about constitutionalizing the Wagner Act 
Model, and in particular majoritarian exclusivity. Rather, to repeat, it was about 
imposing a constitutional requirement on the State to provide workers with a 
meaningful and effective statutory collective bargaining scheme.
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So the failure of the court to take this step, one that was within legal reach 
given existing precedent, was a disappointment, but it was also a reminder 
of the limits of constitutional litigation. The authors in this volume recognize 
that courts are not autonomous and will only go so far in challenging the 
status quo, especially where its decisions impinge on the State’s ordering of 
class relations. But a loss in the courts is never the end of the discussion. It is 
only one more piece in a continuing dynamic. The contraction of constitutional 
space is expressly acknowledged in many chapters, something recognized by 
Travis Fast in his review, and we see no basis in the text for Swartz’s claim 
that the book only “steers the labour movement back towards to the courts.” 
And yet, it must be emphasized that, like it or not, some of the continuing 
struggle for labour rights inevitably takes place in the courts. Workers continue 
to assert their rights in reaction to actions that governments take. This volume 
was intended as a critical intervention in that legal discussion. As a series of 
cases challenging federal and provincial incursions on the right to strike and the 
right to bargain have been heard in the Supreme Court of Canada this spring, 
essays in this volume have been expressly cited in the parties’ arguments and 
so the discussion continues.
Indeed, Swartz’s criticism of the book seemingly operates from an underlying 
premise that Charter litigation and grassroots organizing are dichotomous 
activities. We think Swartz is right to call the labour movement broadly to task 
for emphasizing litigation over mobilizing strategies (although, we are more 
skeptical of this critique in the context of farm workers) to challenge laws that 
constrain collective action. But we do not think an either/or approach is the 
most productive way to think strategically, either for lawyers or activists.  As 
Faraday has repeatedly advocated, a litigation strategy for social change will 
only succeed in conjunction with robust, collective action and mobilization of 
a broad community of allies. We agree with Fast’s observation that courts have 
role to play in democratic deliberation, but cannot be relied upon to sustain that 
deliberation. The challenge may be to think creatively about how to use demands 
for fundamental rights, like freedom of association and equality, demands that are 
powerful tropes and resonate in the body politic, in ways that support mobilizing 
strategies, support broad coalition building, and promote more democratic forms 
of constitutionalism.2
Finally, while we are on the topic of the relation between constitutional 
litigation and organizing mobilization strategies, we want to address a point 
raised by Fast in regard to the Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFWP). He 
correctly notes that the Fraser case was not about ending Canada’s growing use 
of unfree migrant labour. But we are not sure what follows from that observa-
tion. The Fraser case was—as all cases are—responsive to the particular circum-
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stances of a specific group of workers. The farm workers in Fraser organized 
and voted overwhelmingly to unionize. They were, by operation of the law, 
denied the right to do so and they objected. The range of issues that can be 
addressed in any piece of the litigation are bounded by the facts of the specific 
case and the goals of the litigants. What the workers in Fraser wanted was the 
right to unionize.
If Fast’s suggestion is that constitutional litigation should be brought to 
challenge the Temporary Foreign Worker Program itself, this raises very different 
questions, most significantly, what do migrant workers themselves want? What 
does real worker solidarity look like? What legal and systemic change is needed to 
build real security for migrant workers?  Over the past decade, low-wage migrant 
workers have been organizing themselves across all four temporary migration 
streams, and migrant workers themselves have very nuanced and conflicting 
views about the TFWP. What is clear is that some of the most exciting and 
innovative community organizing today is happening among migrant workers 
themselves and their allies. We can see that broad organizing and coalition 
building, including significant grassroots involvement by some of the editors and 
authors of chapters in this book, including the UFCW, is building the political 
momentum necessary to shift deeply entrenched and ideological policies around 
temporary labour migration.
To conclude, this book was about farm workers and their experience of 
attempting to use the Charter to gain access to a legal regime that would provide 
them with a meaningful and effective collective bargaining regime. That effort 
was not quixotic and merits the attention the contributors to this volume have 
given it. We were never under the illusion that this comprised the entirety of the 
struggle. Our reviewers should not be either. 
Notes
1 In this context, it is important to recall that regulations to extend health and safety protection 
to farm workers in Ontario were only made after a constitutional challenge was filed by 
UFCW Canada. Constitutional litigation in Quebec has removed restrictions on farm worker 
organizing in that province. 
2 We explore this possibility at greater length in Fay Faraday and Eric Tucker, “Who Owns 
Charter Values?: A Mobilization Strategy for the Labour Movement”, chapter 8, in Unions 
Matter: Advancing Democracy, Economic Equality and Social Justice, edited by Matthew 
Berens for the Canadian Foundation for Labour Rights, Toronto: Between the Lines, 2014.
